A Simple Suggestion for Copyright Policymakers

This simple suggestion is offered to copyright policymakers around the world.

Copyright economies are complex. So complex that your most carefully designed reforms are likely to have consequences you could not foresee, and may even damage the sectors or people you intended to help. But this does not mean that policymakers are powerless to effect changes that have, over time, a strong positive influence on the creators and businesses that rely on the regulation and oversight of copyright markets.

One area of copyright regulation suffers none of these uncertainties, however, and has an important additional benefit. That area is the shared technical standards by which copyrights are identified and traded. Improvements and regulation there makes future copyright market reform much less controversial by creating a platform of reliable market information on which new proposals can be designed and measured. Get the shared technical standards right and new copyright laws can be future-proofed.

Technical standards help markets by identifying the rights that are being offered and traded, the works in which they are embodied, and the interested parties. They offer tools for efficient and reliable exchange of data about deals and terms, and used honestly they create trust by making copyright industries transparent and auditable. For such a technology driven sector the copyright industries have been surprisingly patchy and slow to adopt electronic trading systems. It’s clear that they need help.

Policymakers do not need to employ teams of experts to design systems, nor attempt to impose technology on the market. Instead, like they do in many other areas of life, their role is to set minimum standards and ensure compliance. Standards will help industry cope with the massive increase in opportunities brought about by digital technology without resorting to radical interventions such as compulsory collective licensing.

Let’s look at how this would work in practice. Take as an example a web site that allows people to upload music tracks and offer them for listening or downloading. In addition to the usual terms and conditions the site would add a requirement that each copyright is identified under an approved scheme, and that uploaders identify themselves. The site would keep proper records of who uploaded what, and would in return get the assurance that they were in compliance with copyright law. Anonymous and unidentified services would not be affected, but could not continue to rely on click-through warrants to provide legal safe-harbours.

Any business that takes assignments, licences, or buys copyrights for onward sale or licensing would be subject to the same requirements. A robust regulatory framework will assume an unbroken chain from each creator to each user of each copyright, and will make that chain accessible on demand to each interested party. Taking this approach will join up today’s jigsaw of data, and will find all the missing pieces, defending creators and users from unwitting infringement or wilful copyright blindness.

This simple suggestion is offered as a least bad choice for policymakers, who are rightly cautious about interfering in the complexities of copyright markets. It avoids completely such vexed issues as extended collective licensing, instead making it clear to all users which copyrights should be considered ‘in the market’ and which remain outside. As a private person perhaps sharing photos with family and friends you would remain unaffected and with your copyright intact; to enter the market you would simply ensure that you and your work become clearly identified.

Many copyrights today are hidden behind layers of assignments and locked in private databases. This is an impediment to trade, as well as making enforcement against counterfeiting and infringement much more difficult. Policymakers should choose to set the rules for the market and let industry do the rest.

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Sony’s Gatfield Shows Mutual Misunderstanding Between Music & ISPs As Deep As Ever

Nick Gatfield, recently appointed CEO of Sony Music UK, took the opportunity of an interview with the Guardian newspaper to do a bit of grandstanding on behalf of the music industry. Broadband businesses he said “are being built on the back of illegal filesharing”, and went on to call ISPs liars if they claim they can’t block web sites.

If the conversations I have been having recently are anything to go by he will find plenty of people in the music industry to throw him a herring for balancing that particular ball on his nose. But sadly just as few able to able to explain the economics of broadband businesses, or the technical and legal implications of site blocking, as there were five or six years ago, when the real conversation about the music and broadband business should have started in earnest.

And that is a shame. Having worked with ISPs for many years I know how much they can learn from the music industry, and how much music can learn from them. The cultures might be poles apart, but complementary rather than antagonistic. Even at a very facile level a business with huge and expensive infrastructure and a 24/7 service ethic, where customer satisfaction – or lack of it – is the most important metric, is where some parts of music already are, and some think they ought to be. And from the other side, even a modicum of emotional engagement, which is the only wallet opener music companies have, could transform a telecoms utility into a much deeper connectivity business.

So what a pity that music, instead of saying “we want to learn about your business so that together we can make more of both of our assets”, instead has dug in for a war of attrition on ISPs’ core technology, their customer relationships, and the fundamental legal protections that manage the risk of investing in public communications infrastructure. And what an opportunity for someone on the music side to reach across the divide.

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Unlicensed Downloading Not a Problem in Switzerland

Unlicensed downloading is just as widespread in Switzerland as it is in most well connected and wealthy countries. Being outside of the European Union however allows the Swiss Government to take its own legal and regulatory path. And the Federal Council has just concluded that filesharing and unlicensed downloading are not a problem.

Here’s a translation of part of their statement on the subject:

The share of disposable income spent by consumers and consumers in this area remains stable. However, there transfers within the budget. Thus, users of sharing sites continue to spend the savings they make by downloading free Internet content on entertainment, but instead of buying CDs and DVDs, they choose concert tickets, films, and merchandising.

It is mainly large foreign production companies which suffer from these new patterns of consumption and they must adapt. As shown in the entertainment budget transfers outlined in the report, fears that these changes have a negative impact on Swiss cultural creativity are unfounded. The Federal Council therefore reaches the conclusion that there is no need to take legislative action.

In other words a simple nationalistic test is all that is necessary. The Swiss have I suspect a negative balance of payments in music and film, and therefore perhaps are less susceptible to arguments that jobs and taxes are dependent on strong withholding rights.

With music licensing increasingly a global business it will be interesting to see if the less protectionist approach the Swiss have adopted keeps out the rights licensing businesses that otherwise might have benefited from the sophisticated financial services infrastructure, low tax, and stability the country offers. Some of the well established performers already live there, ironically benefiting from low taxes on royalties earned in less permissive music markets. A less obvious tax haven for artists is Ireland, which offers an exemption for the first €40,000 in earnings. That of course was not nearly enough to keep Ireland’s biggest music exporter from becoming it’s biggest permanent export when U2 moved their business out in 2006.

The impact of tax rates on royalty flows is dramatic. The Netherlands, despite its unimpressive representation in the creation of music copyrights is nevertheless one of the world centres for licensing due to its zero rate withholding tax on royalty income. If you are shopping for a friendly regime, Deloitte’s provides a handy list and can no doubt advise which presents the best all round value for your particular circumstances. Malta has recently got into the game too with a 0% rate on music.

Is there any kind of lesson here? Switzerland can hardly be held up as a model of progressive liberalism, and indeed its own rationale is a kind of ‘I’m all right Jacques’ two fingers to Hollywood. Tax arbitrage will ensure that no matter how transparent collecting societies are some royalty flows will always be invisible to regulators. Meanwhile national ‘cultural creativity’ seems to march on regardless – there were at least three accordionists in the train station at Swiss watch town Biel when I visited last summer, and all seemed to be collecting enough Francs for a kebab while playing in front of posters for Alpine Opera (a startled marmoset staring at a soprano) and a Peugeot with Lady GaGa bundled from Universal Music.

So no, free downloading makes very little difference to the Swiss, beyond marginally shrinking the number of recording artists who might eventually be looking for a friendly place to domicile their wealth. But for the rest of us the Swiss opinion on downloading is equally irrelevant.

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Unreasonable and Discriminatory Licensing in Online Music

Some time ago I was asked to provide a note that could be circulated to European ISPs about some of the practices employed by music copyright owners which, in my view, represented obstacles to the growth and health of the online music market. A recent discussion on the Pho mailing list prompted me to dig this out and give it a less restricted airing.

It is certainly the case that new entrants to music distribution find the licensing process onerous. One ISP reported a year long negotiation for what seems a simple enough proposition. However the possession of a full hand of licences is such a valuable asset, even in their usual short term and maladapted state, that few successful licensees cry foul, preferring to enjoy the compromised advantages of being in a still exclusive club.

And yet the information that they have, locked down under NDA and the threat of arbitrary withdrawals of catalogues, is crucial for our regulators and public policy makers if they are not simply going to change one set of dysfunction for another. I very much hope that people with inside knowledge of how music licensing actually works will come forward so that there can be a reasonable debate in advance of the macro reform rippling around the world.

Some Unreasonable and Discriminatory Licensing Practices

The fragmented nature of music rights, involving complex contractual obligations wrapped around IP rights in the reproduction, performance, and ‘making available’ of both musical works and sound recordings, makes taking a fully licensed music service to market extremely onerous even if all the rights owners offered simple and efficient ways to access their catalogues. Coupled with this, consumer expectations are very high for online music, and gaps in the available music are not well tolerated.

Set out here are some additional obstacles to efficient music licensing which combine with the already difficult nature of the market to add cost and risk to the emerging digital entertainment industry. All of these practices are potentially repeated by the owners of each of the separate rights that are required to offer music to the public.

Direct licensing or withholding

Most music rights owning parties insist on licensing the use of their catalogues directly, rather than using collective or wholesale clearing houses. Music rights are highly fragmented and require complex management systems, so direct licensing multiplies cost and difficulty for the licensee. Each licensor has the ability to set terms and rates that critically damage the viability of a service, or indeed to withhold the catalogue required to offer a compelling customer proposition.

Territoriality

The underlying rights are territorial, and this is exploited by rights owners in order to limit the operations of music services to specific countries, and also introduce price discrimination. Additionally, licensing of rights within the music industry means that different owners might need to be found and negotiated with for the same rights in different countries, adding cost and complexity to rights and royalty payment systems.

Advances

The larger rights owners usually demand advance payments and deal and delivery fees, which can be many times the expected royalty payments for the use of the music during the term of the agreement. This introduces a financing risk as well as adding a start-up cost to launching a new service. Often these will be staged as quarterly payments, with the threat of catalogue withdrawal or even insolvency proceedings should they not be met. Advances also reduce transparency to other music stakeholders, as they break the relationship between sales and royalty payments.

Short term deals

Many deals have a one year term with no obligation on the rights holder to renew. This introduces obvious risks, that a new music service might not be permitted to continue to offer key catalogues, or that the rights owner might introduce new and onerous obligations. A one year term will in almost all cases be considerably shorter than the planning horizon for a large operator, making it impossible to predict the terms on which a service will be operating as it is rolled out across a customer base, or as marketing activity attracts new customers.

Minima

Rights owners use contractual minimum payments in order to inflate their revenues over and above the value of the music that is actually sold by a service. In some cases this is relatively benign, such as setting a minimum wholesale price per track and taking the greater of that or a percentage of retail price. In per subscription pricing however it can be used to set a price per subscriber that is higher than the licensor’s pro-rata revenue share, or it can be set across an entire service so that the licensor receives a fixed percentage even when their pro-rata share drops. The effect of this is to compel the licensee to pay out over 100% of the royalty pool, eating into margins or operating costs.

Customer proposition approval

Rather than set wholesale pricing and allow operators to develop compelling services, music rights owners seek approval over most aspects of the consumer offering, and insert conditions in contracts that require any changes to be agreed in advance.

Equity assignments

Rights holders sometimes tie warrants or grants of equity to licensing deals giving themselves a route to benefit from increase in the value of that equity alongside any revenue they receive from the sale of music. This has the effect of unbalancing incentives so that rather than the most compelling consumer offering being the market leader the rights holders instead have a reason to exclude competition from the services in which they hold the largest equity positions.

Arbitrary conditions

Rights holders can sometimes put pressure on music service to accept arbitrary conditions, such as using a preferred provider for some aspect of the service, or committing to guaranteed placement for priority releases. Some other arbitrary conditions might include anti-piracy action either as a pre-condition of licensing, or as a commitment included in a contract, or access to a large amount of consumer behaviour data, including data which does not relate to the music included in the contract.

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Remedies Can Make UMG Buying EMI Good For The Whole Music Industry

There seems little point in trying to block the acquisition of EMI’s recorded music business by French conglomerate Vivendi. Citibank, EMI’s owners, have made it clear that they don’t give a fig what Roger Faxon thinks about EMI’s structure or prospects as a standalone company. The UK Government seems determined to watch from the wings, rather than finding a national interest to protect (why is it that musicians’ taxes are requisitioned to support bankers, but the other way around is so politically unacceptable?).

EMI has been making a reasonable job at adapting, albeit a decade later that it might usefully have, to the online digital music business. But Vivendi’s Universal Music Group has demonstrated time and again that it sees its financial and market power as primarily a weapon to be used against its competitors than a tool to expand the market for all. The migration of Robbie Williams is just a more visible sign of the talent drought and second best market access that Universal can impose at will on EMI.

This might be the reality of the music market – large and rather unsophisticated beasts feeding off the carcass of a dead business model. UMG’s new president, Lucian Grainge, is notorious for suggesting that the music industry has a terminal disease, but that his company will be the last one alive. But what if he is wrong, and there is a rejuvenated music industry waiting to emerge? Rather than allow relentless consolidation to create its own rationale, what could regulators do to ensure that the future is less bleak than the most powerful music executive seems determined to make it?

Regulators have a very rare opportunity, with music’s biggest company now a supplicant rather than dictating wishlists to Business Ministers and Commissioners for conversion into new laws. Here’s a little list of things that even in a consolidated market will help creators and consumers come to terms with the new world, and might even tilt the business back towards inclusiveness, innovation, and stronger public support.

1. Make a concerted attack on the ‘black box’.

There’s hardly a corner of the music industry without so called ‘unattributable’ revenue piling up, later to be shared out among the biggest companies on grounds of market share. Even the most apparently fair of the collecting societies are structurally funnelling cash up to their board members which should by rights go to their small and middling members. This is mirrored internally in many businesses – bigger artists get a share, younger upcoming ones have to hope and wait. Quarterly reporting sets up an irresistible incentive for executives to divert the value of catalogues into unattributable pots – equity in licensees, deal fees, delivery fees, unrecoupable advances and minimum sales guarantees all play their part.

Universal can legitimately be asked to lead on dismantling not only the practice itself but also incentives to perpetuate the unfairness. A bigger more honest and cleaner company would be better for music and the market than two majors of the old school.

2. Tackle intra-industry copyright infringement.

Copyrights are infringed within the music industry on a serious scale, but because this is ‘family business’ rightful owners are reluctant to shine a light or ask for help. Typically larger businesses just assume a wider set of rights than they have been granted by smaller ones and by artists, knowing that those involved will be far keener to preserve a relationship than to insist on their copyrights.

Sometimes this is just clumsiness, as when global businesses just claim ‘worldwide’ rights because the administration to do anything else is onerous. Many artists and small labels find their music either claimed or blocked on new platforms for this reason. Sometimes however it is a kind of systematic arrogance, with serious competitive effects on the small companies on the receiving end.

Whichever, what is needed is for the infringed to be encouraged to come forward more often, and for a behavioural nudge to help infringers stay on the straight and narrow. A simple record of cases and adjudications, kept at the IPO, would quickly identify serial offenders, and help everyone know when they need to keep a special watch on their property.

3. Protect trade associations and collecting societies from capture

Trade associations are always going to be vulnerable to capture by their biggest members, who will naturally take the majority of important committee places and are assured votes on the board. Add to that their greater resources for attending and for briefing their representatives, and it is unsurprising that major label voices dominate the debate.

Collecting societies are not immune either, and often play a role in lobbying as well as their core purpose. The guardian of performers’ rights in sound recordings in the UK, PPL, is dominated by the record labels, and acts as a sort of slush fund for industry initiatives, such as the Featured Artists Coalition, leaving the artists themselves with no clear independent self-funded voice. In the recent term extension debate artists effectively found themselves lobbying for a deal that left them very much the poor cousin in the share out of spoils.

It should not be contentious to make sure collecting societies collect and distribute, leaving lobbying to lobbyists. Nor should it be too much to ask trade associations to make it clear where their money comes from and what they spend it on, and to record their decisions. More accountability to all their members is the best protection for trade associations and collecting societies.

Three simple things that would make the music industry much better, with or without an independent EMI in it. It is difficult to be sad about a business that long ago sacrificed its destiny to the whims of financial engineers and asset strippers. The real British music industry is alive and well in the hundreds and thousands of independent record labels, artists, managers, songwriters, studios, venues and festivals that will find their own destiny. We mustn’t let their interests get obscured by the knackered elephant dying in the room.

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We Need a Creators’ Revolution in Music

It is telling how difficult it has proved in the UK for artists and songwriters to find their own voice. The Featured Artists Coalition (artists signed to record labels) has started for sure, but unless I am mistaken its funding comes from PPL, which is owned by the BPI. He who pays the piper…

In the copyright term extension debate some artists did articulate a distinctive position around reversions, but that view was drowned out by PPL lobbying, in the name of artists but for a settlement that transferred money away from young artists and small artist friendly labels and towards dead artists and global corporates. The eventual reversion terms adopted ensured that the only recordings the artists will get back are the ones not worth exploiting.

Composers and songwriters are not immune to the same tensions, with BASCA and the MPA having a spat in the pages of Music Week early 2011 at the same time as they were presenting a unified voice to Government with the MPA and UK Music in response to Hargreaves.

The fact is that copyright lobbying, around both legislation and voluntary regulation, is driven by a very small number of large corporate interests, whose aim seems to be to enhance their control of a sick market rather than provide an open and healthy business environment for all, big, small, old and new.

The original creators and performers, not the Johnny come lately producers, need their hand strengthened, and that will by itself bring more transparency and openness to the music industry. This is clear and obvious to me, and the regressive copyright term extension and the backroom deals being done around the UK’s Digital Economy Act by big corporates and their trade associations are clear evidence if any more were needed.

The creators and performers seem to me to be looking beyond the industry we have to a more open and transparent market for their work. Artists and songwriters rail against the NDAs that their label and publisher representatives insist on inserting into each and every contract; they suffer from opaque reporting and the impossibility of effective audits; and they constantly call for the fetters to be taken off innovation in digital services.

We need a true creators’ revolution in music. That is surely something that the public would understand and support with much more enthusiasm than a Government sponsored crackdown on ISPs in an attempt, probably vain, to protect the profits of a few global corporates.

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The ‘Hysterical Rant’ School of Lobbying Makes, Not Solves, Problems

Richard Mollett, writing on the Publishers Association blog, makes a strident and impassioned plea for the Government to drop its demands for evidence and just accept his credo on the harm done by copyright infringement. He does himself a disservice in comparing the properly sceptical to flat earthers and climate change deniers.

A music industry internal study a few years ago showed three sources of harm to record company revenues: piracy, wholesale price erosion, and unbundling (selling one or two tracks as downloads where before an album might have been bought). It failed convincingly to identify one of these as a critical factor, and ignored effects on profitability, cost structures, and re-investment in new production.

Nobody I have talked to over the last decade has maintained seriously that the net effect of piracy is probably anything other than harmful, in Government, or in ORG, or anywhere else for that matter. The debate Richard seems to have missed is about how harmful it is, and what is an appropriate response, from the music industry itself, the tech and comms industries, and from Government.

In fact, the same internal music industry study attempted to articulate some possible responses and found a great reluctance to address whether music licensing practice, for instance, might be inhibiting the development of services that consumers might prefer to unlicensed filesharing. Instead the drive from the bigger trade associations was to try to revisit secondary liability for communication providers, forcing a strong pushback from ISPs that might otherwise have proved themselves business partners and allies in converting expensive and useless internet traffic into revenue for them.

Hargreaves found that the creative industries as a whole had not even got their own digital supply chain infrastructure in order, despite a decade of trading online. Music, as a sector, is not yet ‘fit for business’ in the digital world; when I have raised this at trade associations I have been told in the past that it’s not an industry level issue, but the rest of the world thinks it is.

My argument to Richard is that a decade of misdirected lobbying has done at least as much harm to the music industry as online piracy, and that his frustration is a direct result of the environment he helped create while at the BPI. As an industry, music saw the relationship between its top executives and Government ministers as more valuable than that between the artists and the fans and music lovers. It failed to help two major UK ISPs get exposed to the positive value of music, while sending its lobbyists to Brussels to argue against service provider exemptions. It failed also to act in proportion to its own estimates of harm, shying away from a robust public defence of its own property in the courts.

Music needs a rebuild from the ground up, and there are many innovative businesses engaged in doing just that. I suspect that the same might be true in publishing. The old big companies are not excluded from the fun – far from it – but they should think twice about using Government Relations as an incumbent defence strategy.

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Lessons for Music from the Steam Age

If you go to London’s Science Museum and look at some of the early commercial steam engines you might notice a ‘pump counter’ which ticked up with every pump of the piston. Boulton and Watt’s original business model was to charge a build fee, and then a usage fee, on the basis that their engine was capable of doing more work more cheaply than the alternatives, within the constraints of the mines and factories in which it was installed.

So, every month I imagine a man with a clipboard doing the rounds, and then a bill arriving which represented the work done – the value added by the engine. It wasn’t cheap, but it made things possible that had not been. And the benefit of their patent was to allow them to sell the work, not the engine.

There seem to be two conventional opinions about this – the first that it was enough that B&W delivered power to kick start the revolution in productivity that changed the world. American industrialist Carnegie was a fan and proponent of this line. The other is that B&W’s overly aggressive use of their patents (they got a legal bill once for £30,000 – which in today’s money is multiples of what EMI is spending to annoy Michael Robertson) delayed the widespread adoption of the technology, and the revolution happened a few years later when the patents expired.

I don’t quite buy either of these, though I am sure each holds some truth. For a start, manufacturing engines was difficult and risky, with many accidents and imperfections. B&W hugely improved manufacturing techniques during their patent period so that robust high performance engines could be made in much larger numbers during the first 2 decades of the C19th than the last 2 of the C18th. One might see a parallel in the electrification of the music industry here – no amount of interesting business model innovation could fill up a pipeline that lacks basic supply chain infrastructure and reporting.

The second point is about the innovator’s investment dilemma, faced with the prospect of losing a constant portion of the value created. The benefit is there enough for B&W to make and sell hundreds of their engines over a few decades. But the mine or factory owner couldn’t run the engine 24/7 without paying more, and nor could they double the output by adding their own innovation. The incentive therefore was very strongly to keep up with the market, because engines did more at less cost, but not to get ahead of the market, because you ended up working for B&W and not yourself.

In fact the greater incentive was to try to deny access to B&W’s engines to your competitors, either by tolerating a higher price than was really justified (in which you might have found B&W to be tacit colluders), or through more devious means.

The parallels with our own rather less industrial music industry are so striking to me that I bothered to do a bit of reading about the subject. They have also led me to think that the digital music industry won’t achieve scale or commercial penetration until the rights owners are prepared to set a price, allow anyone to buy, and then stay out of their customers’ business. Nor do I think that the market will work with a price set on an abstract such as ‘access’ – that would be like selling thermodynamics without cylinders and pistons.

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Copyright Extension, But Nothing for the Artists

The EU looks like it will vote to extend copyright in sound recordings to a maximum of 70 years. Today’s Financial Times notes that the chief beneficiaries are the record labels, who get an additional term on valuable old copyrights (Love Me Do was due to move to the public domain next year) and will see an uplift in the value of their catalogues.

Given that there is no new money coming in to the industry as a result of this extension its effect will be almost entirely redistributive, from younger artists to older and dead ones, and from small innovative labels to moribund catalogue vaults. It would be interesting to see how our Government is going to justify this as good public policy, even if there is a small increase in our national music export revenue.

And I am reminded of Billy Bragg’s eloquent plea that if copyright is to be extended it reverts to the artists themselves. Far more effective as a pension plan, very fair, and potentially a great stimulant to innovation as a stream of valuable recordings get a chance to be made available under a wider range of business models.

So a windfall for Citibank, a bonus for Vivendi, a smash and grab on the public domain, and the usual raw deal for artists. Trebles all round!

Update: Nitpickers might point to a ‘use it or lose it’ provision, a ‘clean slate’, and a ‘session musicians’ fund’ in the text of the Parliament’s draft directive. I would just point out that the ‘use it’ test is set at a very low level (as far as I can see just selling on iTunes would be enough to satisfy it), and of course the other provisions follow on from that. Very different to a reversion in anyone’s book, and anyway in the gift of the record label.

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Traffic Lights: Copyright Education or Leverage?

The PRS has proposed that music related search results should be flagged with a ‘traffic lights’ indicator of whether, according to an independent body, the site linked to is properly licensed for music. The BPI had a similar ‘consumer education’ scheme, whereby approved sites got to display a badge.

This seems a very simple idea. Online music services that want to be licensed would presumably be happy to differentiate themselves, and consumers who want to make sure their business goes to those who pay copyright owners can distinguish them at a glance. Let’s assume that the independent body is well enough managed to keep the list up to date and supply it in a useful way to search engine operators, who are also well enough managed to use it. The PRS proposal simplifies a problem and addresses the consumer confusion set out by Hargreaves.

Dig a little deeper however, and as with so much that comes out of the music industry lobbying machine there is another layer or two beneath this that needs a bit of scrutiny. What effect, for instance, might traffic lights have on music licensing?

The law gives music and recording copyright owners a bundle of rights that they can wrap contracts around for a mix of different uses in different contexts. Some rights are limited, so for instance once a song has been performed or published anyone can perform or record it on payment of a reasonable fee, and can go to a tribunal to get the fee adjudicated. Other rights can be withheld from the market entirely. This is the basis of competitive negotiation in the music industry.

One would imagine that a music service will, if the traffic lights do make the intended difference with consumers, rapidly converge on an ‘essential’ catalogue, the owners of which will be able to charge above their market share as the price for completing the deal, such will be the importance of a green light. To be sure this already happens, but the market can do without a fossilising layer of regulatory bureaucracy to enshrine the behaviour for the foreseeable future.

This would translate into fewer opportunities for smaller or more innovative companies, and fewer choices for musicians and performers when they are selecting their business partners and building their careers. In other words a less open and less fair market for digital music, from creator to consumer.

I have for a long time held the view that the consumer does not need to be patronised and have their time wasted with education schemes. Markets and consumers in them are sophisticated and it is insulting to treat them like primary school children who need to be nudged and bribed to modify their behaviour. The problems the music industry has are the predictable consequences of a dysfunctional wholesale market for music rights, and will be ameliorated by market reform and not enforcement regulation. In fact much of the lobbying I am currently observing seems to me, as a participant in the digital music industry, to be aimed at preserving the market dysfunction to the advantage of the incumbent organisations.

I do not believe that the UK Government has yet made a serious attempt to analyse the copyright market, despite all the fine words about the importance of the creative industries. It would take strong leverage on Government’s part, if not actual compulsion, to discover the evidence which is buried in hundreds of private contracts. Yet we need weights, measures, and fair trading in music just as much as in any other business and none but Government can enforce them for us. There’s a challenge for you Mr Vaizey.

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